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You say it’s your birthday ... 
but could you prove it?
By Cynthia Ford
he annual photo calendars I make for my long-sufering 
family enable me to annotate speciic dates. hus, Sept. 1 says 
“Mom’s Birthday Month!;” Sept. 10 says “Time to shop for 
Mom’s presents;” Sept. 25 “Cake should be chocolate with 
white frosting;” and Sept. 291: “MOM’S BIRTHDAY!” But is 
Sept. 29 really my birthday? Could I prove that in court? How? 
Surprisingly, this subject has required signiicant contortion 
in various evidentiary doctrines. 
The Problem
Rule 602 requires personal knowledge by a witness before 
testifying. “A witness may not testify as to a matter unless 
evidence is introduced suicient to support a inding that the 
witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” he hearsay 
rule, 802, is the lip side of the same concept: if the basis of a 
person’s testimony is a statement by another person, the tes-
timony is inadmissible. “Hearsay is not admissible except…” 
Both rules express the same preference for direct communi-
cation to the jury by the person who actually perceived the 
event and can recount it, under oath and observation. Most 
of all, the hearsay rule guarantees an opportunity to expose 
inaccuracies (or downright lies) through cross-examination, 
“’the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of 
truth.’”2 
I have always “known” my birthdate, but how? No doubt, I 
1  I know you are reading this after Sept. 29, but don’t despair: you can still catch 
me next year, if you calendar now. I like my chocolate dark…
2  John H. Wigmore, quoted in Lilly C. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
was there at the birth, but try as I might, I3 remember nothing 
about it, much less the date on which it occurred. As a new-
born, even if a person had some dim memory of the process4 
it is impossible to think that s/he popped out, looked up at the 
clock, and then used barely-opened eyes to check the calendar 
on the wall. hus, by deinition, the birthday girl herself fails 
the personal knowledge requirement and a foundation objec-
tion should succeed per Rule 602. 
If I am not a qualiied witness as to my birthdate, who is? 
he only people with actual knowledge of the date and time of 
a baby’s birth are those adults who were present at the event. 
For sure, my mother was and remembered it well (as I do the 
births of my two children). he medical personnel involved in 
the delivery could also testify from their personal knowledge, 
but probably don’t retain speciic details as to each of the 
hundreds of babies they help deliver. In 1954 (I just turned 
63, I think), fathers were not present in the delivery room, but 
could at least testify as to the date on which they irst saw their 
newborn, and perhaps give a lay opinion per Rule 701 that 
that was the date of birth. 
So, to prove a person’s birthdate when it is relevant 
(or essential)5 in a legal proceeding, your best bet to avoid 
any evidence objection is to call the person’s birth mother. 
Pragmatically, this simple solution may not be so simple. 
Where the mother is dead (sadly, as is my own) or unknown 
(per older adoption practices) it is impossible to call the 
mother. Even where she is known and alive, she may be across 
the country or hostile. Last of all, the jury has limited patience, 
and may begrudge the time spent on establishing a fact that 
jurors (and all regular people) regard as a non-issue. 
The Fix
Fortunately, the law is not an ass,6 ater all. Even before the 
adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence, state law pro-
3  Apparently a few people think they do, but so far most scientiic sources indi-
cate that the development of the brain makes this extremely unlikely or impos-
sible. My basis for the previous sentence is a 10-minute Internet search, using the 
highly technical term “memory of birth.” As with all things Google, I could have 
spent hours, if not days, reading each of the articles posted there but I did not.  
4  See fn. 3.
5  Statutory rape is the quintessential criminal charge where proof of the ages of 
the defendant and victim are key. See, MCA 45-502. On the civil side, it might be 
tasteless, but Jim Carey’s cross-examination of his own client in “Liar, Liar” proves 
the point: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jQP0Y2T2OQ
6  This phrase is usually attributed to Charles Dickens, in “Oliver Twist” (1838), but 
apparently was irst published by George Chapman in a play in 1654. See, http://
www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/the-law-is-an-ass.html. 
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Both Montana Rules of Evidence 
and Common Law provide practical 
work-arounds for proving a 
person’s birthdate when it is 
relevant in a legal proceeding
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vided and continues to provide several practical work-arounds 
which incorporate into the law of evidence easy and pragmatic 
methods of proving a person’s birthdate. 
A. Common Law
In 18987, only nine years ater statehood, the Montana 
Supreme Court airmed a conviction of “rape upon a child 
of less than 16 years” by her father, Bowser. he defendant 
argued that the victim’s testimony as to her own age was 
inadmissible hearsay. he Court rejected this view, largely on 
practical grounds:
Recent authorities hold that the age of a 
prosecuting witness alleged to be under the age 
of consent may be proved by her own testimony. 
Underh. Cr. Ev. § 342; Whart. Cr. Ev. § 236; 
People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915; Bain v. 
State, 61 Ala. 75. he fact that the witness derived 
her knowledge of her age from statements of her 
parents, or family reputation, does not make it 
inadmissible. Persons of the age of discretion, 
and many who are of even tender years, know 
enough of themselves to state their ages with 
intelligence and accuracy. Such testimony is 
oten essential to prove age, and for this reason 
it is competent; being excepted from the rules 
generally excluding hearsay evidence.
Bowser also argued that he should have been allowed to 
test the basis of the victim’s knowledge of her birth, appar-
ently through voir dire before she gave her direct testimony, 
but lost that one too:
[C]ounsel make a point upon the ruling of 
the court denying their request to interrogate 
the prosecutrix concerning her knowledge of 
the fact of her age. But, although the leave to 
examine the witness was denied while she was 
testifying in response to questions put to her 
by the county attorney, it appears that upon 
cross–examination defendant’s counsel had full 
opportunity to test her knowledge of her age, and 
did test it, and thereater moved to strike out all 
of the testimony of the witness concerning her 
age, because it was hearsay. he ruling of the 
court was correct, and no prejudice was done to 
appellant’s rights.
In State v. Vinn,8 Vinn was convicted of statutory rape of 
his stepdaughter. he girl, Florence, testiied for the prosecu-
tion as to her age, saying that she was 17 on the date of the 
event charged (another part of the case deals with the admis-
sibility of several similar uncharged events). he defense 
disputed her personal knowledge:
She was questioned further as to the sources of 
her knowledge, and stated that her mother had 
told her of the date of her birth. She also stated 
that she had seen the certiicate of her baptism, 
which recited the date of her birth. It was 
7  State v. Bowser, 21 Mont. 133, 53 P. 179 (1898). 
8  50 Mont. 27, 144 P. 773 (1914).
objected that this evidence was not admissible, 
because it was hearsay…
he Montana Supreme Court airmed the admission of the 
victim’s testimony about her age, despite her lack of personal 
knowledge, invoking both Bowser and common law from 
other states, which also was based largely on necessity:
he fact that the witness derived her knowledge of her age 
from statements of her parents, of family reputation, does not 
make it inadmissible. Persons of the age of discretion, and 
many who are of even tender years, know enough of them-
selves to state their ages with intelligence and accuracy. Such 
testimony is oten essential to prove age, and for this reason 
it is competent, being excepted from the rules generally 
excluding hearsay evidence. (Emphasis added)
he court also was untroubled by Florence’s testimony 
that she had seen a baptismal certiicate, which showed her 
birthdate. Acknowledging that the certiicate itself was prob-
ably inadmissible, the court nonetheless found the victim’s 
testimony about the contents of the certiicate proper: 
It may be conceded… that the baptismal 
record was not admissible to prove the date 
of the witness’ birth, though it recited this 
date. (Citations omitted)…he result of the 
examination, however, was not to introduce 
the contents of the certiicate, but to disclose to 
the jury how, in part, the witness obtained her 
knowledge. If the person whose age is in question 
may prove it by his own testimony, the fact that 
he gains his knowledge from the statements 
of his parents or from family reputation does 
not render his testimony inadmissible. State 
v. Bowser, supra; People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 
46 Pac. 915. He certainly cannot have personal 
knowledge of the circumstances attending his 
birth, nor of its date. Neither do we see how 
such testimony can be rendered incompetent by 
the fact that the same knowledge has also been 
gained by the reading of writings in possession 
of the family and preserved as records of family 
history.
In the same case, Florence’s mother, wife of and witness 
for the defendant, testiied that Florence was in fact over 18 
on the critical date. here apparently was no objection to 
this evidence, because as we have seen above, the mother had 
the requisite personal knowledge. However, on rebuttal, the 
prosecutor called several rebuttal witnesses to prove that on 
other occasions, the mother had told them that Florence was 
under 18. he Montana Supreme Court did not diferentiate 
between the possible uses of these prior inconsistent state-
ments, but found no problem with their admission, and the 
defense apparently did not ask for an instruction limiting the 
out-of-court statements to impeachment rather than proof of 
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the fact they asserted.9 
One of the witnesses who testiied that Mrs. Vinn had 
told her Florence was under 18 was the Fergus County 
Superintendent of Public Schools. he superintendent’s 
testimony went further, and established the foundation for 
admission of a school registration document. he judge over-
ruled the defense hearsay objection, and again was airmed 
on appeal, under the public records exception: “he document 
was a public record required by law to be kept by this oi-
cer. … It was admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts 
therein stated.” 
State v. Newman10 is to the same legal efect as Vinn 
and is a colorful depiction of Butte America in 1930. Chief 
Justice Callaway’s recitation of the facts is one of the gems of 
Montana jurisprudence:
he story the transcript tells smacks rather of the 
early day mining camps than of the Montana of 
the present era. Defendant, once before a convict, 
ran a dance hall called the Bowery, where he sold 
whisky over a “lunch–counter,” and provided 
dancing girls who worked upon a percentage 
basis. he success of the girls depended upon the 
number of drinks they persuaded their partners 
to buy. he evidence respecting the conduct of 
defendant’s place might serve to bring to the 
minds of the oldsters the warning note of the 
well–known ballad of the early ’90s, in which the 
singer, ater narrating that such things were done 
and said on the Bowery, declared he would never 
go there any more!
According to the state’s evidence, defendant employed 
prosecutrix to work at the lunch counter in the Bowery, but 
quickly transferred her to the dance loor, although he knew 
that she was but sixteen years of age He insisted upon her 
drinking whisky whenever her partner called for drinks at the 
bar —which was at the end of each dance. One night when 
she was intoxicated defendant took her from the dance loor 
to his bedroom where he raped her. he bedroom was con-
nected with the kitchen which adjoined the dance hall. Twice 
again he did that. hen he came to stand before a bar himself, 
the probability of which he might, with the exercise of a little 
sense, have foreseen—the bar of justice, and he must now take 
what it dispenses.
In Newman, the convicted rapist was the 16-year-old girl’s 
employer, rather than a family member. he family testiied 
consistently for the prosecution that she was 16. Despite their 
lack of personal knowledge, the defendant did not object to 
the testimony of age from the victim or her sister. he only 
9  Now, the MRE would allow these prior inconsistent statements as substantive 
proof that Florence was indeed 17, not 18. MRE 801(d)(1) provides: “A statement is 
not hearsay if: (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testiies at the trial 
or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and 
the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony.” This is one of the 
areas in which Montana difers signiicantly from the FRE version, which allows a 
prior inconsistent statement for substantive purposes only if the statement “was 
given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a depo-
sition,” not the case in Vinn.
10  88 Mont. 558, 294 P. 377 (1930).
issue on appeal seems to be the admission of the baptism 
certiicate produced by the mother, to resolve her confusion 
about the exact month of her daughter’s birth, but the defen-
dant failed to object to its admission. 
Prosecutrix and her married sister testiied that prosecutrix 
was 16 years of age when the alleged ofense was committed, 
and that she would not be 17 until Jan. 31, 1930. he sister 
said she had told defendant before prosecutrix went to work 
for him that the girl was only 16. he mother of prosecutrix, 
who spoke English imperfectly, said the girl was 16, was born 
in 1913, but was confused as to the month. On cross–exami-
nation the witness said she had a paper at home showing 
when prosecutrix was born. During a recess, the paper was 
procured, and, upon redirect examination, it was ofered; 
counsel for defendant saying, “We admit it in evidence.” he 
document was a certiicate of baptism, dated Feb. 13, 1913, in 
which it was recited that prosecutrix was born Jan. 30, 1913. 
It may be that the certiicate would have been excluded had 
proper objection been made (State v. Vinn, 50 Mont. 27, 144 
P. 773), but defendant’s counsel, having consented to its ad-
mission, cannot now urge error. 
B. Montana Rules of Evidence
he hearsay exceptions in Montana Rules of Evidence 
803 and 804 codify several methods of proving a person’s 
birthdate, and thus age, some of which are oral and others 
documentary. he key to using these tools is to recognize the 
inherent hearsay problem before trial, and then prepare to ei-
ther avoid it (by calling the mother, see above) or provide the 
foundation corresponding to the applicable hearsay exception. 
803(4): Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment…. hese usually consist of statements by a pa-
tient to a health care provider, who then testiies about those 
statements. he Montana Commission Comment observes: 
“he guarantee of trustworthiness is provided by the patient’s 
motivation for proper diagnosis and treatment.“ he rule 
limits the subjects of these statements, but includes statements 
of “medical history,” which seems to include statements of a 
patient’s age so long as “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment.” here are no Montana cases applying this excep-
tion to a statement about a patient’s age, but if the witness/
health care provider testiies that they11 needed the age to 
diagnose or treat the patient, this exception should work. Here 
is a sample foundation:
Q: Who are you?
A: I am the doctor who treated V.
Q. As part of your ordinary treatment, do you take a medi-
cal history from your patient?
A. Yes, always; it is the standard practice for all doctors.
Q. In this case, did you need to know the age of V in order 
to treat her appropriately?
A. Yes.
11  It is hard for me to use the plural “they” when I am clearly talking about a 
single witness, but old dogs do learn new tricks, and one of my former students 
recently wrote convincingly about the need to abandon gender-specifying pro-
nouns. For a better explanation, see, e.g., https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2016/01/08/donald-trump-may-win-this-years-word-of-the-year/?utm_
term=.a81fd9f76573
Birthday, page 16
Page 15www.montanabar.org
Page 16 November 2017
Q. Why?
A. Because….
Q. Did you explain why you needed to know how old V 
was to her/her mother (depending on who transmitted the 
information)?
A. Yes.
Q. What did V/mother say when you asked how old she 
was?
A. She said she was 13.
803(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compila-
tions, in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, 
if the report thereof was made to a public oice pursuant to 
requirements of law. 
 he only Montana case that applies this exception dealt 
with a death certiicate, where the court held that the certii-
cate was admissible to prove the death, but that the informa-
tion that the decedent was a passenger (rather than the driver, 
as the defendant contended) should have been redacted. State 
v. Gould.12 Montana law requires registration of live births13, 
as well as deaths, so this subsection should apply equally to 
birth certiicates ofered to prove the date of birth. Under an 
identical federal version of 803(9), the 9th Circuit held that a 
Mexican birth certiicate (properly authenticated14, an entirely 
diferent issue) was admissible in a criminal case where the 
defendant was convicted of being a deported alien found in 
the United States, although the issue apparently was location 
rather than date of birth. U.S. v. Palomares-Munoz.15 
803(11) Records of religious organizations. Statements of 
births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, rela-
tionship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of per-
sonal or family history, contained in a regularly kept record of 
a religious organization. 
he Montana Evidence Commission commented that 
this is a specialized form of the 803(6) “business records” 
exception, but stronger: [religious records have the] “same 
guarantees of trustworthiness as the records admitted under 
Exception (6). his guarantee is enhanced by the unlikelihood 
of false information being provided to religious organiza-
tions.” he federal Advisory Committee Note discusses explic-
itly the use of church baptism certiicates to prove age: 
However, both the business record doctrine and Exception 
[paragraph] (6) require that the person furnishing the infor-
mation be one in the business or activity. he result is such 
decisions as Daily v. Grand Lodge, 311 Ill. 184, 142 N.E. 478 
(1924), holding a church record admissible to prove fact, date, 
and place of baptism, but not age of child except that he had 
at least been born at the time. In view of the unlikelihood that 
false information would be furnished on occasions of this 
kind, the rule contains no requirement that the informant be 
in the course of the activity.
12  216 Mont. 455, 704 P.2d 20 (1985).
13  50-15-221. Birth registration.
14  Birth certiicates are self-authenticating under M.R.E. 902, so if you obtain the 
necessary certiication from the public oice which holds them, you should be 
able to admit these as exhibits without any witness. 
15  5 Fed.Appx. 709, 2001 WL 219951.
his ACN thus seems to authorize use of a baptism cer-
tiicate, including any included statement as to the baptisee’s 
birth, to prove birthdate in addition to baptism date. Because 
church records are not self-authenticating, the proponent will 
need to call a foundation witness to admit a religious record, 
to testify both as to its authenticity and to the foundation facts 
of a religion which keeps records:
Q. Who are you? 
A. I am a minister/rabbi/imam etc. in the church/temple/
mosque etc. of …
Q. Is that a religious organization?
A. Yes.
Q. Does your organization keep regular records of its reli-
gious ceremonies and activities?
A. Yes.
Q. Do these records include records of the births in mem-
bers’ families, including the dates of those births?
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you believe that these records are accurate?
A. Yes. 
Q. Do your records include a record of the birth of V?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you identify Exhibit A?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. Is that an accurate photocopy of a record in your orga-
nization’s iles?
A. Yes.
Q. Whose birth record is it?
A. V’s.
Q. I ofer Exhibit A. May I publish an enlargement for the 
jury?
Q. According to your record, Exhibit A, what is the date of 
birth of V?
A. Sept. 29, 1954. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certiicates. 
Statements of fact contained in a certiicate that the maker 
performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a 
sacrament, made by a member of the clergy, public oicial, or 
other person authorized by the rules or practices of a reli-
gious organization or by law to perform the act certiied, and 
purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within 
a reasonable time thereater.
his subsection is similar to the preceding one, but deals 
with certiicates of events (ceremonies or sacraments), rather 
than simply religious records of personal or family history 
facts. Its guarantee of trustworthiness is similar to the public 
records and vital statistics exceptions but: “goes beyond those 
exceptions in the area of sacrament and so expands Montana 
law. Note the certiication procedure requires authentication. 
See Rule 902.” MT Commission Comment. In the context 
of proving birthdate/age, this exception seems to apply to 
religious ceremonies performed at birth, or other sacraments 
administered at speciic ages such as Christian baptism and 
conirmation or bar and bat mitzvah in the Jewish religion. I 
could not ind any Montana case applying this subsection. 
he necessary foundation and authentication for the bar 
mitzvah example would be:
Q. Who are you? 
Birthday, from page 14
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A. I am the rabbi of Temple Sinai.
Q. Is that a religious organization?
A. Yes, it is a Jewish temple.
Q. Do the rules or practices of your religion authorize you
to perform ceremonies or sacraments?
A. Yes.
Q. Does your religion issue certiicates to relect these cer-
emonies or sacraments?
A. Yes.
Q. Are these certiicates issued at or near the time the cer-
emony or sacrament occurs?
A. Yes.
Q. Is a bat mitzvah one of these ceremonies?
A. Yes.
Q. Does a bat mitzvah occur at a certain age?
A. Yes, at 13.
Q. Do you recognize Exhibit B?
A. Yes.
Q. What is Exhibit B?
A. A certiicate of bat mitzvah for V, dated Oct. 1, 1967,
issued by Temple Sinai. his is a photocopy of the certiicate 
we have in our iles.
Q. And does Exhibit B show the date of the bat mitzvah of
V? 
A. Yes, Sept. 30, 1967.
Q. Does Exhibit B make any statement as to the birthdate
of V?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. What is the date of V’s birthday, according to the bat
mitzvah certiicate?
A. Sept. 29, 1954.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning per-
sonal or family history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, 
charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, 
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like. 
he Montana Evidence Commission commented that (13) 
is identical to FRE 803(13), and with Montana law prior to 
adoption of the MRE, observing further: “he guarantee of 
trustworthiness is provided by the unlikelihood that a false 
family record would exist.” he Commission cited a 1915 
case, In re Colbert’s Estate16, in which a mutilated family Bible 
was admissible, even though neither the trial judge nor the 
Supreme Court thought it bore much weight:
he learned trial judge in receiving it said:
“I will admit it in evidence. What weight I will give it is a 
matter for future consideration. I don’t like the looks of it.”
With this attitude we are in entire accord. he admissibil-
ity of a family Bible containing a family tree or record does 
not depend upon authorship or authenticity of the entries; but 
upon the fact that it is the family Bible and record, recog-
nized as such by those with whose genealogy or pedigree it is 
concerned (People v. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915; Jones v. 
Jones, 45 Md. 144), and for the same reason neither chrono-
logical order nor supericial integrity can be a condition to its 
reception, whatever efect these circumstances may have upon 
its probative value. So, in view of the testimony of Mrs. Beedy 
that these entries were made by persons who are now dead 
16  51 Mont. 455, 153 P. 1022 (1915).
and that the Bible and record have always been recognized in 
the family of Mrs. Clement as their family Bible and record, 
we think it was admissible, though as a factor in respondents’ 
case it may be worse than worthless.
153 P. at 1026. I have not found any cases on this issue 
decided since the M.R.E. 
I do have, maybe ghoulishly, an urn containing the 
remains of my dear departed Irish wolhound, Fiona, which 
states “Best huge17 dog ever, made it to 14 years old!” Under 
803(18), the second half of this inscription would be admis-
sible, because it states a fact “concerning personal history.” I 
could use it to prove that Fiona18 lived 14 years. he irst half, 
the opinion “best huge dog,” does not qualify because it is an 
opinion, not a statement of fact, even though it is inscribed on 
an urn. he exact evidence would be something like:
Q. Who are you?
A. Cynthia Ford.
Q. Did you have a dog named Fiona?
A. I did, about 40 years ago.
Q. Do you remember how old she was when she died?
A. Not exactly. I think she was pretty old, but I have for-
gotten exactly how old. 
Q. Do you have Fiona’s ashes?
A. Yes, I can’t bring myself to give them up, even though
it’s been years. I guess I should see someone about that.
Q. Do you keep the dog’s ashes in an urn?
A. Yes, I do, and I brought it here today.
Q. Is exhibit A the urn itself?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there an engraving on the urn, Exhibit A?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that engraving state a historical fact as to Fiona’s
age?
A. It does.
Q. Move the admission of Exhibit A.
J. Admitted.
Q. Please read to the jury the second half of the inscription
on the urn.
A. “Made it to 14 years old!”
his out-of-court statement, ofered to prove the dog lived
for 14 years, is admissible even though it is hearsay, because of 
803(13). 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history.
Reputation among members of a person’s family by blood, 
adoption, or marriage, or among a person’s associates, or in 
the community, concerning a person’s birth, adoption, mar-
riage, divorce or dissolution of marriage, death, legitimacy, 
relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or 
other similar fact of personal or family history.
Under this subsection, a wide variety of witnesses may 
testify to a person’s birthdate (and other personal facts) by 
recounting the reputation in a designated group about that 
fact. he Montana rule is identical to the federal rule, and the 
Montana Commission Comments quote the federal Advisory 
17  Our household also includes a mid-sized Golden Retriever and a tiny Norwich 
terrier, so this distinction is critical to save ofense.
18  I do recognize the argument that “family” might not include pets, but I will 
leave that discussion to my fabulous colleague, Professor Stacey Gordon, who has 
much more expertise in animal law. 
Page 18 November 2017
Notes, which in turn quote Wigmore:
he guarantee of trustworthiness of this and other reputa-
tion exceptions that follow is found “when the topic is such 
that the facts are likely to have been inquired about and that 
persons having personal knowledge have disclosed facts which 
have thus been discussed in the community; and thus the 
community’s conclusion, if any has been formed, is likely to 
be a trustworthy one”. Advisory Committee’s Note, 56 F.R.D. 
supra at 317, quoting 5 Wigmore, Evidence, Section 1580 at 
444.
he commission noted but accepted the expansion of this 
rule from the common law, which restricted such evidence to 
family members, to associates and community members. he 
topic of this testimony likewise was broadened beyond mar-
riage to include today’s subject, birth, and several other facts.
By analogy to other uses of reputation evidence, the wit-
ness needs to be a member of a group in which the reputation 
is known. his could be the birthday girl herself, or any other 
member of the group, so long as the witness can establish that 
there is such a reputation and what it is. Here, for example, 
let’s use the victim’s brother:
Q. Who are you?
A. I am V’s brother.
Q. In your family, does everyone have a belief as to V’s 
birthday? 
A. Yes, we all know when it is and celebrate it then every 
year.
Q. Would you call that a reputation within the family? 
A. I guess so.
Q. What is the reputation in your family as to V’s 
birthday?
A. hat she was born on Sept. 29, two years before me, so 
1954.
Although only a few oices regularly celebrate workers’ 
birthdays, if V is employed at one of those, any of her cowork-
ers could testify similarly:
A. I am the accounting supervisor at EJ, Inc., and I have 
worked there for ive years.
Q. How many other employees are there?
A. Fiteen.
Q. Is V one of them? 
A. Yes.
Q. At EJ, Inc., do you celebrate each other’s birthdays?
A. Yes; we like to think of ourselves as a kind of family.
Q. What is the reputation at your oice about when V’s 
birthday is?
A. Do you mean when do we celebrate V’s birthday? 
Q. Yes.
A. On Sept. 29.
Q. Is there a reputation for how old V is, what year she was 
born?
A. She just turned 63, so 1954. We had 63 candles on the 
cake.
Again, I could not ind any Montana Supreme Court cases 
applying this subsection — maybe you will be the irst to use it 
in some case where age is disputed. 
MRE 804 provides several other exceptions to the hearsay 
rule, but these can be used only if the declarant who said “X 
was born on Sept. 29, 1954” is unavailable to testify in person. 
Rule 804(a) lays out non-exclusive examples of unavailabil-
ity, including death or illness. Once you have proven that the 
declarant can’t be a witness, section 804(b)(4) comes into play 
for establishing a birthdate: 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. 
(A) A statement concerning the declarant’s 
own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce or 
dissolution of marriage, legitimacy, relationship 
by blood, or family history, even though the 
declarant had no means of acquiring the personal 
knowledge of the matter stated; or 
(B) A statement concerning the foregoing 
matters, and death also, of another person, if 
the declarant was related to the other by blood, 
adoption or marriage or was so intimately 
associated with the other’s family as to be likely 
to have accurate information concerning the 
matter declared.
he Montana Evidence Commission Comments note that 
MRE 804(b)(4) is substantially identical to the federal version, 
and observes: 
he distinction between 803(19) and this exception is that 
Rule 803(19) allows the same subject matter to be proven 
by reputation evidence while this exception relies upon the 
declaration of an unavailable witness to prove the same type 
of facts. he guarantee of trustworthiness for this exception 
is identical to that found for Rule 803(19). … In addition, it 
is quite natural for persons to discuss family history among 
members of the family or close friends and it is highly unlikely 
that falsehood would be repeated in this context.
he unavailable declarant can be the subject herself, under 
(A), or someone else either in the subject’s family or very 
close to the family (B). he test is not whether the declarant 
had personal knowledge of the birthdate, but whether she was 
“likely to have accurate information” of the date. 
I did not ind any Montana cases applying MRE 804(b)(4), 
although there are some federal and other state cases out there 
that might be persuasive if you had the irst Montana case. 
However, the text of the rule itself provides suicient guidance 
for the foundation requirements for this hearsay exception. 
he witness is someone who heard the declarant state the sub-
ject’s birthday. Under A, the declarant was the birthday girl 
herself. he witness is anyone who heard the birthday girl say 
what her birthday was.
Q. Did you ever hear V say what her birthdate was?
A. Yes, a million times.
Q. Is V here in the courtroom today? 
A. No.
Q. Do you know why not?
A. Yes, she is in the hospital in labor with her irst baby.19 
I drove her there myself this morning. OR Yes, she died last 
year. [his is necessary to show unavailability under 804(a)].
Q. What did V tell you about her birthdate?
19  This basis for unavailability under Rule 804(a), pregnancy, will actually be the 
subject of another, much shorter, Evidence Corner column soon.
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A. She was born on Sept. 29, 1954.
Under 804(b)(4)(B), the out of court declarant was some-
one other than the birthday girl, who was either in the family 
or suiciently close to the family that the declarant would 
likely have accurate knowledge of the birthday, perhaps an old 
family friend. he witness is anyone who heard the declarant 
state the birthday of the subject:
Q. Are you related to V?
A. No, but I knew her brother, Ben.
Q. Do you know why Ben is not in the courtroom for this 
trial?
A. Yes, he is dead.
Q. Did Ben ever tell you what V’s birthdate was?
A. Yes. He said she was born on Sept. 29, 1954.
Non-hearsay: two more ways to skin the cat: defendant’s 
own admission and observation of jury
In the 2014 case of State v. Ghostbear,20 defendant was 
convicted of sexual assault. he victim was his girlfriend’s 
daughter. Ater the verdict, the trial judge concluded that 
the prosecution had failed to establish the age diferential 
between defendant and victim which would trigger a felony, 
rather than misdemeanor, penalty. he state appealed, and 
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for sentencing 
as a felony,21 even though the jury did not make a speciic 
inding of the ages of the defendant and victim. he majority 
described the evidence at trial:
While Ghostbear contends and the District 
Court determined that there was no evidence 
of his age and the age of the victim, the record 
shows otherwise. he State correctly notes that 
during trial the District Court admitted into 
evidence a recording and a transcript of an 
interview of Ghostbear by a law enforcement 
oicer. Early in that interview Ghostbear stated 
that his date of birth was in 1977, making him 34 
years old at the time of the ofense. 
In addition, in that same interview Ghostbear 
acknowledged that the victim was just turning 
age 8, making her age 7 at the time of the alleged 
ofense. he victim also testiied that she was 
age 8. he jury heard this evidence and was able 
to corroborate the respective ages of Ghostbear 
and the victim because each of them testiied 
at trial. he jurors were entitled to infer from 
what they observed that the ages of Ghostbear 
and the victim were as he acknowledged them 
to be in the admitted interview. he jurors 
were instructed that they could consider “the 
appearance of the witnesses on the stand.” 
he jurors saw, and therefore could consider, 
the appearance of Ghostbear as a mature man 
and the victim as a child. Ghostbear does not 
point to any contrary evidence of age in the 
record nor does he argue that there was any 
conceivable way that the jury could fail to 
conclude that the victim was under the age of 16 
20  376 Mont. 500, 338 P.3d 25, 2014 MT 192
21  Justices McKinnon and Baker concurred in the result.
and that Ghostbear was more than 3 years older. 
Ghostbear does not contend that the respective 
ages were in any way contested during the trial.
he concurring justices opined that the judge had commit-
ted error with regard to charging the jury on the elements of 
the crime, but then concluded that the error was harmless:
A.T. testiied that she was eight years old at the time of 
trial, making her six or seven at the time of the ofense. In 
Ghostbear’s interview with law enforcement, a recording of 
which was played at trial, he acknowledged that A.T. was just 
turning eight. In addition, he stated that his date of birth was 
in 1977, making him 33 or 34 at the time of the ofense. At 
trial, Ghostbear was asked, “Did you drink when you were a 
kid?” to which he responded, “No, ... I didn’t have a drink of 
alcohol until I was 18 years old.”
he evidence of A.T.’s age and Ghostbear’s age 
was uncontroverted. he evidence established 
that A.T. was roughly six or seven at the time 
of the ofense and Ghostbear was three or more 
years older than A.T. Indeed, no rational trier of 
fact could have concluded that A.T. was over 16 
years old or that there was less than a three-year 
age diference between A.T. and Ghostbear.
his case demonstrates that if approximate age or a difer-
ential in ages is all that is necessary, rather than an exact date, 
the jury may simply consider the appearance of the witnesses 
as they testify. To make sure this is clear, the party using this 
route should propose a jury instruction based on Ghostbear, 
to the efect that “As well as any other evidence on the issue of 
age, you are entitled to infer from what you observed during 
the trial the age(s) of ______.” 
Lastly, the admission of Ghostbear’s own statement as to 
the age of the victim by his opponent, the prosecution, also 
escaped the hearsay rule and substantively established her age. 
MRE 801(d)(2)(A) provides, as sort of a magic wand, that an 
out-of-court statement ofered to prove what it asserts is not 
hearsay, even though it otherwise exactly its the deinition of 
hearsay in 801(c), if that statement was made by the opposing 
party:
A statement is not hearsay if…
(2) Admission by party-opponent. he statement is of-
fered against a party and is (A) the party’s own statement…
he Montana Commission comment notes that this 
subsection is identical to the FRE. he federal Advisory 
Committee Note speciically provides that personal knowledge 
by the party-opponent declarant of the fact asserted is NOT 
required for admission of his statement: 
No guarantee of trustworthiness is required 
in the case of an admission. he freedom 
which admissions have enjoyed from technical 
demands of searching for an assurance of 
trustworthiness in some against-interest 
circumstance, and from the restrictive 
inluences of the opinion rule and the rule 
requiring irsthand knowledge, when taken 
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Lawyer Referral & Information Service
When your clients are looking for you ... They call us
How does the LRIS work? Calls coming into the LRIS represent every segment of society with
every type of legal issue imaginable. Many of the calls we receive are from out of State or even out of the country, 
looking for a Montana attorney. When a call comes into the LRIS line, the caller is asked about the nature of the 
problem or issue. Many callers “just have a question” or “don’t have any money to pay an attorney”. As often as pos-
sible, we try to help people ind the answers to their questions or direct them to another resource for assistance. If 
an attorney is needed, they are provided with the name and phone number of an attorney based on location and 
area of practice. It is then up to the caller to contact the attorney referred to schedule an initial consultation.
It’s inexpensive: The yearly cost to join the LRIS is minimal: free to attorneys their irst year in prac-
tice, $125 for attorneys in practice for less than ive years, and $200 for those in practice longer than ive years. 
Best of all, unlike most referral programs, Montana LRIS doesn’t require that you share a percentage of your fees 
generated from the referrals!
You don’t have to take the case: If you are unable, or not interested in taking a case, just
let the prospective client know. The LRIS can refer the client to another attorney.
You pick your areas of law: The LRIS will only refer prospective clients in the areas of law that
you register for. No cold calls from prospective clients seeking help in areas that you do not handle.
It’s easy to join: Membership of the LRIS is open to any active member of the State Bar of Montana in
good standing who maintains a lawyers’ professional liability insurance policy. To join the service simply ill out 
the Membership Application at www.montanbar.org -> Need Legal Help-> Lawyer Referral and forward to the 
State Bar oice. You pay the registration fee and the LRIS will handle the rest. If you have questions or would 
like more information, call 406-442-7660 or email mailbox@montanabar.org. We are happy to better explain 
the program and answer any questions you may have. 
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with the apparently prevalent satisfaction with 
apparently prevalent satisfaction with the results, 
calls for generous treatment of this avenue 
to admissibility.the results, calls for generous 
treatment of this avenue to admissibility.
hus, even if Ghostbear’s lack of actual personal knowl-
edge about the birthdate of the victim would preclude his live 
testimony at trial about her age (unless one of the routes ex-
plored above applied), it does not bar admission of his out-of-
court statement on the subject, so long as his opponent ofers 
that statement. he lesson here is to scour the information in 
your case to see if, anywhere, your opponent has acknowl-
edged the age or birthdate which you must establish. If so: 
consider that a present, whether it is your birthday or not. 
Conclusion
Consider this column my birthday present to you, when-
ever your birthday is and however you “know” that. See you 
next month, when we will all be a bit older.
Professor Cynthia Ford teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, 
Family Law, and Remedies at the University of Montana’s 
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